[C-safe-secure-studygroup] Bounds-checked interfaces
Charles.Wilson at draeger.com
Wed Jan 16 20:05:18 GMT 2019
Without seeing a direct quote from Clive, I can only comment on the general principle.
Any code, whether new or modified, creates opportunities to inject new defects. The point being that, on its face, this is a statement which serves to justify not addressing technical debt. Writing code is a dangerous business requiring sound design, implementation and verification. I know people who I would trust to modify “working” code and other I would not entrust the task of microwaving popcorn.
From: C-safe-secure-studygroup [mailto:c-safe-secure-studygroup-bounces at lists.trustable.io] On Behalf Of Robert Seacord
Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2019 1:46 PM
To: C Safety and Security Study Group Discussion <C-safe-secure-studygroup at lists.trustable.io>; Clive Pygott <Clive.Pygott at ldra.com>
Subject: [C-safe-secure-studygroup] Bounds-checked interfaces
I'm working on a paper on bounds-checked interfaces that I'm going to solicit reviewers for soon.
Meanwhile, I've heard Clive defend the following principle:
This is a widely-held expert view that changes to “working code” only increase the opportunities to inject new defects. This view has even been expressed by the safety-critical community.
I'm wondering if there is an authoritative source I could reference on this claim?
I'm tempted just to write "Clive says...." ;^)
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